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"L. RON HUBBARD, HOW MUCH IS A RELIGIOUS
SERVICE WORTH, AND DO BOX SEATS COST
EXTRA?": THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF MANDATORY
DONATIONS UNDER SECTION 170 OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE
Congress enacted section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code)
to permit individuals and corporations, in computing their income tax
liability, to deduct from gross income contributions that the individuals
made to religious, charitable, scientific, or educational nonprofit organiza-
tions (the charitable contribution deduction).' In enacting the charitable
contribution deduction, Congress recognized that permitting individuals to
deduct charitable contributions would support Congress' policy goals. 2 For
1. See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (1987) (stating that individuals may deduct charitable contri-
butions); I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (1987) (providing that charitable contributions are gifts to or
for use of charitable organizations). In 1917 Congress first permitted individuals to deduct
contributions that the individuals made to charitable organizations. Revenue Act of 1917, ch.
63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300. Congress originally enacted § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code) as § 214(a)(10) of the Revenue Act of 1924. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 214(a)(10),
43 Stat. 253 (Congress' original provision for charitable contribution deduction); see 436 Tax
Mgmt. (BNA) Income Tax Series 127 (1986) (discussing statutory history of charitable contri-
butions). Since 1924 Congress has changed only the percentages of taxable income that limit
the amount which a taxpayer may deduct as charitable contributions. See I.R.C. § 170(b)
(stating various percentages that Congress currently permits taxpayers to deduct for charitable
contributions); H.R. REP. No. 8300, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1954) (permitting taxpayers to
deduct up to 307o of taxpayers' adjusted gross income for charitable contribution); Revenue
Act of July 8, 1952, ch. 588, 66 Stat. 442, § 4(a) (allowing taxpayers to deduct up to 200 of
taxpayers' adjusted gross income for charitable contributions); Revenue Act of 1917, supra, §
1201(2) (permitting taxpayers to deduct up to 15% of taxpayers' adjusted gross income for
charitable contributions); Tax Mgmt., supra, at 127 (describing statutory changes in § 170
since its original enactment). In 1917, Congress allowed taxpayers to deduct a maximum of
an amount equal to 15 % of taxable income from gross income as charitable contributions.
See Revenue Act of 1917, supra, at § 1201(2) (permitting taxpayers to deduct up to 15%0 of
taxpayers' adjusted gross income for charitable contributions). In 1952, Congress increased
the percentage allowable for charitable contributions from 15% to 20%. Revenue Act of July
8, 1952, ch. 588, 66 Stat. 442, § 4(a) (allowing taxpayers to deduct up to 20% of taxpayers'
adjusted gross income for charitable contributions). In 1954, Congress increased the amount
of the charitable contribution deduction to 30% of taxpayers' adjusted gross income. H.R.
REp. No. 8300, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1954) (permitting taxpayers to deduct up to 300 of
taxpayers adjusted gross income for charitable contributions). Today, Congress allows taxpayers
to deduct up to 50% of adjusted gross income for charitable contributions. I.R.C. § 170(b)
(1987) (stating various percentages that Congress permits taxpayers to deduct for charitable
contributions).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938) (stating Congress' goals in
enacting charitable contribution deduction); 55 CONG. REc. 6728 (1917) (noting that imposition
of heavy tax burdens on taxpayers during World War II would force taxpayers to economize
and decrease charitable contributions); B. BrrrKER, FtNDAmzNTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX-
ATION § 19-1 (1983) (discussing Congress' purpose in enacting charitable contribution deduction);
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example, Congress thought that the charitable contribution deduction would
stimulate individuals to contribute funds to charitable organizations.' Ac-
cordingly, Congress hoped that individuals' charitable contributions would
minimize the need for the government directly to allocate funds to charities.
4
In addition to lessening the government's budgetary pressures, Congress
also hoped that individuals' charitable contributions would enhance charities'
economic ability to provide educational, cultural, and religious activities for
the public.5 Congress noted that allowing an individual to take deductions
for charitable contributions would decrease an individual's taxable income
and thus decrease the government's revenue resulting from income taxation.
6
Congress recognized, however, that the benefits of the charitable contribu-
tion deduction compensated the government for the loss of potential revenue
resulting from the decreases in taxable income.
7
Although Congress believed that the charitable contribution deduction
would increase the frequency of charitable contributions and thus enhance
a charity's ability to provide educational and cultural activities for the
public, Congress noted that the opportunity for an individual to reduce his
income tax liability might prompt the individual to abuse the deduction
privilege by characterizing all contributions as charitable.8 Accordingly,
Congress provided that a contribution must meet certain requirements before
436 Tax Mgmt., supra note 1, 127 (discussing legislative history of § 170 and Congress'
purposes for enacting § 170). In 1917 Congress began to allow taxpayers to deduct charitable
contributions from gross income because Congress was concerned that the effects of World
War I would reduce an individual's propensity to contribute to charities. See 55 CONG. REc.
6728 (1917) (expressing Congress' hope that allowing taxpayers to take deductions for charitable
contributions would increase taxpayers' giving of charitable contributions); R. KAHN, PERSONAL
DEDUCTIONS IN TE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (1960) (discussing Congress' fear that high tax
rates prevailing during World War I would reduce amount and frequency of taxpayers'
charitable contributions); 436 Tax Mgmt., supra note I, at 127 (discussing Congress' recognition
of need for charitable deduction to stimulate charitable contributions).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938) (stating that Congress
enacted charitable contribution deduction to encourage taxpayers to make charitable contri-
butions). By enacting the charitable contribution deduction under § 170 of the Code, Congress
wished to increase private sector support of charities and thus relieve the government of the
burden of supporting charities. Id.
4. Id. (discussing Congress' purposes in enacting § 170 of Code).
5. See id. (stating that Congress enacted charitable contribution deduction to assist
charities in providing public benefits).
6. See id. (discussing decrease in taxable income resulting from charitable contribution
deduction). Congress stated that the charitable contribution deduction would lead to a loss in
the government's revenue from taxation. Id.
7. Id. (discussing Congress' belief that benefits of charitable contribution deduction
would compensate government for loss of revenue).
8. See id. (discussing need for donations to meet certain requirements to constitute
charitable contributions). To close tax loopholes, Congress enacted requirements that payments
must meet before the payments constitute deductible charitable contributions. Id. Congress
noted that requirements were necessary to ensure that contributions which taxpayers deducted




an individual can deduct the contribution.9 To take a deduction for a
charitable contribution under section 170 of the Code, an individual must
contribute to one of the different types of charitable organizations described
in section 170.10 Additionally, to qualify as a deduction, an individual's
transfer of funds to the charitable recipient must constitute a "contribution
or gift."'" Courts have determined that the term "gift" is synonymous with
the term "contribution.' ' 2 Under section 170(c) of the Code, a charitable
contribution is a contribution to or for the use of a charitable organization. 3
Because Congress has not defined the term "contribution" in section 170
or explained the meaning of "contribution" in the legislative history of
9. See I.R.C. § 170 (1987) (providing that payments must satisfy certain requirements
to constitute charitable contributions); see also B3. Bittker, supra note 2, §19-2 (discussing
limitations that Congress imposed on charitable contribution deduction); Colliton, The Meaning
of "Contribution or Gift" for Charitable Contribution Deduction Purposes, 41 Omo ST. L.J.
973, 973 (1980) (discussing requirements for charitable contribution deduction under § 170 of
Code); Hobbet, Charitable Contributions- How Charitable Must They Be?, 11 SETON HALL L.
REv. 1, 1 (1980) (discussing statutory requirements for charitable contribution deduction).
10. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (1987) (describing organizations to which taxpayer must
contribute for payment to constitute charitable contribution). A taxpayer's payment will
constitute a contribution under section 170 if, for example, the taxpayer contributed to a
charitable organization such as a corporation, trust, community chest, fund, or foundation
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes. Id.
11. See id. § 170(c) (taxpayer's payment must constitute contribution or gift to qualify
for deduction under § 170).
12. See DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1962) (stating that
"contribution" is synonymous with "gift" under § 170 of Code); Channing v. United States,
4 F. Supp. 33, 34 (D. Mass.) (discussing similar meanings of "contribution" and "gift"),
aff'd per curiam, 67 F.2d 986 (1st Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 686 (1934); Oakknoll v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1380, 1381 (1978) (noting that "contribution" and "gift"
are synonymous under § 170), aff'd, 79-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9328 (2d Cir. 1979); Rainer
Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 68, 77 (1973) (noting that "contribution" and "gift" have
similar meanings under § 170 of Code); Rev. Rul. 72-506, 1972-2 C.B. 106, 106 (stating that
"contribution" is interchangeable with "gift" under § 170); Rev. Rul. 71-112, 1971-1 C.B.
93, 93 (discussing similar meanings of "contribution" and "gift"); Hobbet, supra note 9, at
1 (noting that courts have interpreted "contribution" and "gift" as having same meaning
under § 170 of Code).
13. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (1987) (defining charitable contribution). Under the Code, a
contribution is a payment to a charitable organization. Id. However, not all payments that
taxpayers make to charitable organizations are deductible charitable contributions. See, e.g.,
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1216 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that parishioner's
payments to Church of Scientology were not deductible charitable contributions); Graham v.
Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that parishioners' may not take
deductions for their mandatory payments to church); Miller v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500,
501 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that church member may not deduct from gross income mandatory
payments that member made to church). Although Congress has defined "contribution",
Congress has not defined "charitable contribution" or provided guidance for assessing whether
a payment constitutes a charitable contribution. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (1987) (demonstrating that
Congress failed to provide useful definition of "contribution"). Thus, Congress' definition of
contribution is circular, ambiguous, and unhelpful for courts in determining whether a
taxpayer's payment constitutes a charitable contribution under section 170. See id.
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section 170, and the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) has not defined
"contribution" in the Income Tax Regulations, courts have attempted to
determine the meaning of "contribution" under section 170.14 Courts have
applied a variety of tests for determining whether voluntary payments to
charities constitute contributions under section 170.15 Generally, courts have
considered only whether voluntary payments are contributions under section
170.16 Recently, however, federal circuit courts have examined and disagreed
about the deductibility of mandatory payments that otherwise meet all of
the section 170 charitable contribution requirements.
17
Four federal circuit courts have considered whether church members
may deduct payments that the members made to a church if the church
deems the payments mandatory (mandatory charitable contribution)." In
each of the cases that the circuit courts have decided, church members
claimed deductions for mandatory charitable contributions to the Church
14. See I.R.C. § 170 (1987) (containing no definition of "contribution"); see also Miller
v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that, because Code does not
define "contribution," courts have attempted to define "contribution" by examining Congress'
intent in enacting charitable contribution deduction); Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F. 2d 844,
848 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing tests that courts have used to determine whether payments
constitute contributions under § 170); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1216 (1st
Cir. 1987) (discussing methods courts have employed in defining "contribution" under § 170);
Colliton, supra note 9, at 973-74 ((noting that courts and Internal Revenue Service (Service)
have not satisfactorily defined "contribution" under § 170)); Hobbet, supra note 9, at 2
(discussing difficulty of defining "contribution" under § 170 without congressional guidance).
15. See Sedam v. United States, 518 F.2d 242, 245 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating that payment
is contribution under § 170 if contributor does not intend to receive commensurate benefit in
return for payment); Oppewal v. United States, 468 F.2d 1000, 1002 (Ist Cir. 1972) (noting
that taxpayer's voluntary payment to charity is contribution if amount of payment exceeds
value of benefit which taxpayer received in return for payment to charity); Singer Co. v.
United States, 449 F.2d 413, 422 (Cl. Ct. 1971) (concluding that taxpayer's payment is charitable
contribution if taxpayer did not expect financial return equal in value to amount of taxpayer's
payment); Dejong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1962) (applying "detached
and disinterested generosity" test to determine whether voluntary payments constituted con-
tributions under § 170).
16. See, e.g, Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000, 1002 (1st Cir. 1972) (determining
whether voluntary payments that parents made to school for children's education constituted
deductible charitable contributions under § 170); Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413,
415 (CI. Ct. 1971) (considering whether sewing machines that corporation voluntarily sold at
discount to charitable organizations constituted deductible charitable contributions); Dejong v.
Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1962) (assessing whether voluntary payments that
parents made to school for children's education constituted deductible charitable contributions).
17. See Miller v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500, 501 (4th Cir. 1987) (considering whether
mandatory payments that parishioners made to church constitute deductible charitable contri-
butions under § 170); Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1987) (same);
Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1325 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); Hernandez v. Commis-
sioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1216 (1st Cir. 1987) (same).
18. See supra note 17 (noting circuit courts that have considered and decided whether




of Scientology. 19 The primary goal of the Church of Scientology is to save
society by reaching a "State of Clear," which is an increased level of
spiritual awareness. 20 To reach full spiritual awareness, a parishioner par-
ticipates in two religious services or practices called "auditing" and "train-
ing." 21 The goal of auditing is to benefit each level of life, or "dynamic,"
including one's self, family and sex, one's group, mankind, living things,
the physical universe, the spiritual universe, and the Supreme Being.?
2
Through "training," which is the study of the Church of Scientology's
scriptures, Scientologists become enlightened and teach other individuals to
understand the teachings and practices of Scientology.3 Scientologists believe
that participation in auditing and training services benefits both parishioners
and society.u
In return for permitting church members to participate in auditing and
training services, the Church of Scientology requires church members to
make payments to the church.2? The church refers to the payments as "fixed
donations.1 26 Fixed donations are the primary source of funding for the
church's operations. 27 Because the church believes that individuals should
not receive a benefit without giving something of themselves in return for
the benefit, the church requests that parishioners who receive the benefit of
religious services contribute monetarily to the church. 2 Some parishioners
19. See Miller v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500, 501 (4th Cir. 1987) (determining whether
members may deduct from gross income mandatory payments that members made to Church
of Scientology); Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1987) (considering
whether members of Church of Scientology may deduct from gross income mandatory payments
that members made to church); Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1325 (8th Cir. 1987)
(noting that taxpayer was member of Church of Scientology and made mandatory payments
to church); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1216 (Ist Cir. 1987) (stating that
cases deciding deductibility of parishioners' mandatory payments to Church of Scientology are
factually indistinguishable).
20. See Brief for Appellant at 4, Miller v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1987)
(No. 86-2090). Founder L. Ron Hubbard based the Scientology religion on his teachings and
research. Id. Each church member, or Scientologist, believes that studying the teachings and
research of the church's founder will lead the member to an understanding of man's existence.
Id. Scientologists strive to make themselves aware that they are spiritual beings. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. Scientologists divide life into eight steps or "dynamics." Id. Members of the
Church of Scientology believe that, by increasing awareness, an individual benefits all eight
dynamics. Id. Scientologists maintain that the improvement of the eight dynamics will lead to






28. See Brief for Appellant at 4, Miller v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1987)
(No. 86-2090); see also Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 846-47 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating
that Doctrine of Exchange requires parishioners of Church of Scientology to make mandatory
payments to church in return for religious services). Under the Doctrine of Exchange, a basic
tenet of Scientology, individuals and organizations need to balance exchanges or the "inflow
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who contributed monetarily to the church in the form of fixed donations
attempted to deduct the amount of the mandatory contributions from their
gross income.29 The Service, however, did not permit the parishioners to
and outflow" within and between dynamics to produce ethical individuals. See Brief for
Appellant, supra, at 4; see also Graham, 822 F.2d at 846-47 (explaining that Doctrine of
Exchange is basic tenet of Scientology requiring members that receive benefits to give something
of themselves in return for benefits). The Doctrine of Exchange provides the foundation for
the structure of fixed donations. See Graham, 822 F.2d at 846-47. Because the Scientology
religion is based on the Doctrine of Exchange, the church requires members to make mandatory
payments to the church in return for the religious services that the church provides for the
members. Id.
29. See Miller v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500, 501 (4th Cir. 1987) (assessing whether
parishioner may deduct from gross income mandatory payments); Graham v. Commissioner,
822 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1987) (determining whether mandatory payments are charitable
contributions and, thus, deductible under § 170); Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324,
1325 (8th Cir. 1987) (considering whether parishioners may take deductions for mandatory
payments that parishioners made to church); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212,
1216 (1st Cir. 1987) (considering whether mandatory payments constitute deductible contri-
butions under § 170 of Code). In Staples v. Commissioner Maureen and Michael Staples made
mandatory payments to the Church of Scientology. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1325. The Service did
not permit the Staples to take a deduction for the mandatory payments. Id. In affirming the
Service's decision, the United States Tax Court held that, because the Church of Scientology
required parishioners to make mandatory payments in return for religious services, the
mandatory payments were not contributions under § 170 of the Code. Id. The Staples appealed
the Tax Court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the ]vighth Circuit. Id.
In Hernandez v. Commissioner, a case similar to Staples, Robert L. Hernandez made
mandatory payments to the Church of Scientology. Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1215. During
1981, Hernandez paid $7,338 to the Church of Scientology in exchange for religious services.
Id. Hernandez deducted the mandatory payments as charitable contributions on his 1981 federal
income tax return. Id. The Service, however, disallowed the deduction and assessed a $2245
tax deficiency against Hernandez. Id. The United States Tax Court affirmed the Service's
refusal to permit a deduction for the mandatory payments and the deficiency assessment
against Hernandez. Id. Hernandez appealed the Tax Court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Similarly, the parishioners in Graham v. Commissioner also were members of the Church
of Scientology. Graham, 822 F.2d at 846. The three parishioners in Graham made mandatory
payments to the Church of Scientology. Id. In 1972 Graham paid $1682 to the Church of
Scientology, Hawaii, and to the Scientology and Dianetic Center of Hawaii. Id. at 847. Graham
deducted the amount of the payments as charitable contributions on her 1972 income tax
return. Id. In 1975 Hermann paid the Church of Scientology, American Saint Hill Organization,
$4875 and deducted the amount of the payments as charitable contributions. Id. In 1977,
Maynard paid the Church of Scientology, Mission of Riverside, $4,698.91. Id. Maynard
deducted $5000 as a charitable contribution on his 1977 income tax return. Id. The Service
did not permit the parishioners to take deductions for the mandatory payments. Id. The Tax
Court affirmed the Service's decision that the mandatory payments were not contributions
under § 170 because the payments were mandatory and the parishioners expected a commen-
surate benefit in return for their payments to the church. Seeid.; Graham v. Commissioner,
83 T.C. 575, 581 (1984). The parishioners appealed the Tax Court's adverse ruling to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Graham, 822 F.2d at 846.
As in the other Scientology cases, the parishioner in Miller v. Commissioner made
mandatory payments to the Church of Scientology. Miller, 829 F.2d at 501. The Service
refused to permit the parishioner to take a deduction for the mandatory payments that she
made to the church. Id. The Service held that the parishioner could not deduct the payments
1580
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take deductions for the amount of the mandatory payments that the
parishioners made to the church. 0 The United States Tax Court affirmed
the Service's decision not to permit any of the parishioners to deduct from
gross income the amount of the fixed donations that the parishioners made
to the church.31 Each of the parishioners appealed the Tax Court's adverse
decisions to a United States Circuit Court of Appeals.
32
In Graham v. Commissioner33 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit considered whether mandatory charitable donations that
parishioners made to the Church of Scientology constituted contributions
that were deductible under section 170 of the Code. 34 In determining whether
the mandatory donations were deductible, the Ninth Circuit applied a test
that the circuit had adopted in previous decisions for determining whether
a voluntary donation qualifies as a deductible contribution under section
170 .3 The "detached and disinterested generosity" test which the circuit
unless she could establish that the payments exceeded the value of the benefits she received
from the church in return for her payments. Id. The Tax Court affirmed the Service's opinion.
Id. Miller appealed to Tax Court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. Id.
30. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (noting that Service disallowed parishioners'
deductions for mandatory payments that parishioners made to church).
31. See Graham v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 575, 581 (1984) (discussing Tax Court's
decision that payments to church did not constitute charitable contributions under § 170 of
the Code); supra note 29 and accompanying text (noting that Tax Court disallowed all
parishioners deductions for mandatory payments they made to church). The parishioners in
Graham, Staples, Hernandez, and Miller stipulated at the Tax Court level that the Tax Court's
finding of fact and law in the test case, Graham v. Commissioner, in the Ninth Circuit would
be binding on all of the parishioners. See Miller, 829 F.2d at 501.
32. See Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1325 (8th Cir. 1987) (considering
whether parishioners may take deductions for mandatory payments that parishioners made to
church); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1216 (1st Cir. 1987) (determining whether
mandatory payments constitute contributions under § 170 of Code); Graham v. Commissioner,
822 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1987) (assessing whether mandatory payments are charitable
contributions and thus deductible under § 170); Miller v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500, 501
(4th Cir. 1987) (discussing whether parishioner may deduct mandatory payments from gross
income); supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing parishioners' appeal of Tax Court's
adverse holding to federal circuit courts).
33. 822 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1987).
34. Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 848-50 (9th Cir. 1987).
35. Id. at 848; see Babilonia v. Commissioner, 681 F.2d 678, 679 (9th Cir. 1982)
(applying detached and disinterested generosity test to decide whether parents' traveling expenses
to see daughter perform in ice skating competitions constituted charitable contributions under
§ 170); Allen v. United States, 541 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1976) (discussing application of
detached and disinterested generosity test to assess whether landowner's dedication of land to
city constituted deductible charitable contribution); Collman v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 1263,
1267 (9th Cir. 1975) (applying detached and disinterested generosity test to determine whether
landowner's voluntary transfer of land to county for road expansion was deductible charitable
contribution); Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1970) (discussing whether
landowner's dedication of land for public road constituted charitable contribution under
detached and disinterested generosity test), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971); Dejong v.
Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373, 376-79 (9th Cir. 1962) (considering whether parents' voluntary
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court adopted in the voluntary contribution cases provides that a contri-
bution is charitable if a contributor makes the payment with detached and
disinterested motives.3 6 In Graham, the Ninth Circuit stated that, under the
detached and disinterested generosity test, a contributor could take a char-
itable deduction only when the contributor's primary purpose in making a
voluntary or mandatory contribution was to benefit the charity rather than
the contributor. 37 In support of its use of the detached and disinterested
generosity test, the Ninth Circuit stated that the test was in accord with
United States v. American Bar Endowment,38 a recent decision by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
3 9
In American Bar the United States Supreme Court held that a contri-
bution is deductible if an individual transfers money or property to a
charitable organization without receiving adequate consideration in return
for the contribution (market test). 40 The taxpayer in American Bar made a
charitable payment to a tax-exempt endowment fund. 41 In return for the
taxpayer's payment, the endowment fund transferred an insurance policy to
the taxpayer. 42 The Supreme Court determined that the taxpayer's payment
to the endowment fund consisted of both a charitable contribution and a
transfer in return for a marketable benefit to the taxpayer.4 3 Because the
tuition payments for children's education constituted deductible charitable contributions under
detached and disinterested generosity test); infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (discussing
United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit's application in Graham v. Commissioner
of detached and disinterested generosity test to determine if mandatory payments constituted
charitable contributions under § 170).
36. Graham, 822 F.2d at 848.
37. Id.
38. 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
39. Graham, 822 F.2d at 849. Although the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Graham v. Commissioner believed that the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. American Bar Endowment supported the application of
the detached and disinterested generosity test under § 170, the Supreme Court did not apply
the detached and disinterested generosity test in American Bar. See American Bar, 477 U.S.
at 115 (showing that Supreme Court did not apply detached and disinterested generosity test
to assess whether taxpayer's payment to endowment fund constituted charitable contribution);
Graham, 822 F.2d at 849 (citing American Bar decision as support for applying detached and
disinterested generosity test to decide whether parishioners' mandatory payments to church
constituted charitable contributions); infra notes 40-45 (discussing test that Supreme Court
applied in American Bar to determine whether payment constituted contribution under § 170).
40. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986). In American Bar
the United States Supreme Court held that a payment is not a charitable contribution if the
taxpayer making the payment received a benefit from the charity with a fair market value
equal to the amount of the taxpayer's payment. Id.
41. Id. at 110.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 513. In United States v. American Bar Endowment the United States Supreme
Court noted that the taxpayer received an insurance policy from the endowment fund for
making a payment to the fund. Id. The Supreme Court stated that the insurance policy was
a marketable benefit because similar insurance policies with easily calculable values existed in
the market place. Id. The Supreme Court calculated the fair market value of the benefit that
1582
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insurance policy had a fair market value and directly benefited the taxpayer,
the Supreme Court did not allow the taxpayer to deduct the amount of the
taxpayer's contribution to the endowment fund that equaled the value of
the insurance policy." The Supreme Court permitted the taxpayer, however,
to deduct the portion of the payment to the endowment fund that exceeded
the fair market value of the insurance policy.
4
Accepting the American Bar decision as support for applying the
detached and disinterested generosity test to determine whether a mandatory
donation constitutes a contribution under section 170, the Ninth Circuit in
Graham held that the parishioners were not detached and disinterested
contributors because the parishioners expected to receive religious services
in return for their contributions to the church. 6 The court determined,
therefore, that the parishioners did not intend to make contributions to the
church.47 In American Bar, the Supreme Court held that a portion of the
taxpayer's payment was not charitable because the insurance policy that the
taxpayer received was similar to other insurance policies that had fair market
values. 4s Similarly, the Ninth Circuit stated in Graham that the parishioners
the taxpayer received in return for his payment to the endowment fund by comparing the
amount of the taxpayer's payment with the fair market value of a comparable insurance policy
in the marketplace. Id. If the fair market value of the insurance policy that the endowment
fund gave to the taxpayer for making a payment to the fund was of equal value to the amount
of the taxpayer's payment, the Supreme Court held that the taxpayer's payments would not
constitute a deductible charitable contribution. Id.
44. Id. In United States v.American Bar Endowment the United States Supreme Court
determined that the insurance policy that the taxpayer received in return for his payment to
an endowment fund had a value equal in amount to the fair market value of a comparable
insurance policy. Id.
45. Id.
46. Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1987). In Graham v. Com-
missioner the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit thought that the United
States v. American Bar Endowment decision supported the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the
detached and disinterested generosity test under § 170, although the United States Supreme
Court did not apply the detached and disinterested generosity test in American Bar. See id.;
see also American Bar, 477 U.S. at 513 (adopting market test to determine whether payments
to endowment fund were charitable contributions under § 170 of Code). Thus, the Ninth
Circuit incorrectly cited the American Bar decision as support for the Ninth Circuit's application
of the detached and disinterested generosity test to determine whether a payment constituted
a contribution under § 170. See Graham, 822 F.2d at 849 (citing American Bar decision as
support for use of detached and disinterested generosity test to determine whether payments
were deductible charitable contributions under § 170); see also American Bar, 477 U.S. at 513
(applying market test rather than detached and disinterested generosity test to determine if
taxpayer's payment to endowment fund constituted deductible charitable contribution).
47. See Graham, 822 F.2d at 849 (holding that mandatory payments to church did not
constitute charitable contributions because parishioners did not make payments with detached
and disinterested motives).
48. American Bar, 477 U.S. at 513. In United States v. American Bar Endowment a
taxpayer made a payment to an endowment fund and the endowment fund gave the taxpayer
an insurance policy in return for the taxpayer's payment. Id. The United States Supreme Court
in American Bar determined that the taxpayer's payment consisted of a portion that was a
charitable contribution and a portion that was not a charitable contribution. Id. The Supreme
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could not deduct the payments that the parishioners made to the church
because the religious services had a fair market value.49 The Ninth Circuit
noted, however, that it easily could determine the economic value of the
religious services, not because similar religious services with fair market
values existed, but because the church placed a monetary value on the
religious services. 50 Because the Ninth Circuit relied on the mandatory
payment structure rather than a fair market value analysis in holding that
the parishioners' payments were not deductible charitable contributions, the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Graham did not follow the reasoning of American
Bar.5 The Graham court noted that the existence of the church's fixed
payment structure was evidence that the religious services possessed a fair
market value and were transferable in a commercial transaction.5 2 Because
of the church's mandatory payment structure, the Ninth Circuit held that
the parishioners never intended to contribute to the church and, therefore,
that the payments were not deductible as contributions under section 170
of the Code. 53
Court held that the portion of the taxpayer's payment to the endowment for an insurance
policy was not charitable because the value of the policy equaled the fair market value of
comparable insurance policies. Id.; see supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing United
States Supreme Court's method in American Bar for determining value of insurance policy
that taxpayer received in return for his payment to endowment fund).
49. Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that parishioners'
payments to Church of Scientology were not deductible because payments were mandatory).
Patterning its reasoning after the United States Supreme Court in United States v. American
Bar Endowment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Graham v.
Commissioner that the parishioners' payments to the Church of Scientology were nondeductible
because the religious services that the parishioners received in return for their payments had
a fair market value. Id.; see American Bar, 477 U.S. at 513 (holding that taxpayer's payment
to endowment fund in return for insurance policy did not constitute charitable contribution
because payment was equal in value to fair market value of insurance policy); supra notes 40-
45 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court's decision in American
Bar). Unlike the Supreme Court in American Bar, which determined the fair market value of
the taxpayer's benefit by examining the fair market value of comparable benefits, the Ninth
Circuit determined the market value of religious services by examining only the payments that
the Church of Scientology required from the members. See id.; see also American Bar, 477
U.S. at 513 (applying market test to determine whether taxpayer's payment was charitable
when benefit that taxpayer received in return for payment was equal in value to fair market
value of comparable benefits). Thus, the Ninth Circuit did not follow the Supreme Court's
method of comparing the value of the benefit that the taxpayer received in return for his
payment with the fair market value of a similar benefit. See Graham, 822 F.2d at 849 (assessing
market value of religious services by focusing on amount of payments that church required
members to pay); see also American Bar, 477 U.S. at 513 (determining fair market value of
insurance policy by examining fair market value of similar insurance policies).
50. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (suggesting that United States Court of
Appeals for Ninth Circuit's application of detached and disinterested generosity test in Graham
to determine whether mandatory payments constituted charitable contributions was not in
accordance with United States Supreme Court's decision in American Bar).
51. Id.




Just as the Ninth Circuit held in Graham, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held in Hernandez v. Commissioner54 that a
parishioner's mandatory payments to the Church of Scientology were not
deductible charitable contributions. 5 The First Circuit applied the American
Bar market test and the detached and disinterested generosity test to assess
whether the payments constituted contributions under section 170 of the
Code. 6 The First Circuit first applied the detached and disinterested test to
ascertain whether the parishioner made payments to the charity with the
intention of making a contribution rather than making a payment to receive
a benefit.57 The First Circuit explained that, if the court found that the
parishioner intended to contribute to the charity, the court would apply the
American Bar market test to determine whether the value of the parishioner's
contribution exceeded the value of the benefit that the parishioner received
from the charity in return for the contribution.58 If the First Circuit found,
however, that the parishioner's payment did not meet the requirements of
the detached and disinterested generosity test, the court would not apply
the market test because the parishioner must intend to make a contribution
before the court would determine under the market test which portion of
the parishioner's payment constituted a deductible contribution. 9 The First
Circuit stated in Hernandez that the parishioner did not demonstrate an
intent to contribute an amount in excess of the value of the religious services
54. 819 F.2d 1212 (1st Cir. 1987).
55. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1218 (1st Cir. 1987).
56. Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1216-18. In Hernandez v. Commissioner, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit maintained that a charitable contribution is deductible
to the extent that the payment exceeds the fair market value of the benefit which the contributor
receives, but only if the contributor intended to contribute to the charity by paying an amount
in excess of the value of the benefit received. Id. at 1218.
57. Id. at 1218 (applying detached and disinterested generosity test to determine whether
parishioner's mandatory payments to church constituted deductible charitable contributions).
In Hernandez v. Commissioner the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that Hernandez, the appellant, did not prove that the mandatory payments which he made to
the Church of Scientology exceeded the church's cost for providing religious services. Id. The
First Circuit also found that Hernandez failed to prove that he intended to contribute to the
church. Id. The First Circuit stated, therefore, that Hernandez's payments were not deductible
charitable contributions under the detached and disinterested generosity test. Id.
58. Id. In Hernandez v. Commissioner the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit noted that, if the parishioner's mandatory payments to the Church of Scientology did
not constitute charitable contributions under the detached and disinterested generosity test, the
court did not need to apply the market test that the United States Supreme Court adopted in
United States v. American Bar Endowment. Id.; see also United States v. American Bar
Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986) (applying market test to determine whether taxpayer's
voluntary payment to endowment fund constituted deductible charitable contribution under §
170); supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court's
application of market test in Anierican Bar to assess whether taxpayer's payment to endowment
fund constituted deductible charitable contribution).
59. Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1218 (noting that payments must meet requirements of
detached and disinterested generosity test before First Circuit will apply American Bar test).
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which the parishioner received.60 Because the court found that the parishioner
did not intend to make a contribution to the church, the First Circuit stated
that the court need not apply the market test under American Bar.61 Thus,
under the detached and disinterested generosity test analysis, the First Circuit
held that the parishioner's payments were not contributions under section
170.62
Concurring with the First Circuit's holding in Hernandez, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Miller v. Internal Revenue
Service63 held that a parishioner's mandatory payments to the Church of
Scientology were not deductible contributions under section 170. 64 In deter-
mining whether the mandatory payments were contributions under section
170 of the Code, the Fourth Circuit recognized that neither the courts nor
Congress has provided a satisfactory definition of "contribution" or an
adequate test for evaluating whether a payment is a deductible contribution.
65
The Fourth Circuit stated, however, that the court did not need to resolve
the difficulty in adopting a test to assess whether the parishioner's payments
were charitable contributions. 66 In Miller, the Fourth Circuit declined to
choose a particular test because the court believed that the payments which
the parishioner made to the church did not constitute deductible charitable
contributions under any of the available tests. 67 Because the court believed
60. Id. at 1218 (noting that Hemandez did not prove that he intended to contribute to
church). In Hernandez v. Commissioner the First Circuit held that Hernandez did not
demonstrate to the court that Hernandez's payment exceeded the Church of Scientology's cost
in providing religious services to Hernandez. Id. The First Circuit also found that Hernandez
failed to prove that he intended the mandatory payments to the church to constitute charitable
contributions. Id.; see also supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing First Circuit's
holding in Hernandez that payments must meet requirements of detached and disinterested
generosity test before First Circuit will-apply American Bar test).
61. Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1218; see also supra note 59 and accompanying text (noting
that First Circuit will not apply market test if parishioner's payment does not meet requirements
of detached and disinterested generosity test).
62. Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1218; see supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing
First Circuit's rationale for holding that parishioner's mandatory payments to Church of
Scientology did not constitute deductible charitable contributions under § 170).
63. 829 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1987).
64. Miller v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500, 505 (4th Cir. 1987).
65. Miller, 829 F.2d at 501-02. Recognizing the lack of congressional guidance in
determining whether a payment constitutes a deductible charitable contribution, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Miller v. Commissioner noted that a limited
amount of legal literature has addressed the difficulty in determining whether a payment is a
charitable contribution. Id. The Fourth Circuit stated that legal writers have considered whether
courts should investigate the transferor's subjective intent or motive in making a payment, or
objectively assess the difference in value of the transferred property and any return benefits
to the transferor. Id. at 502; see generally Colliton, supra note 9, at 1000-05 (discussing test
that courts should apply in determining whether taxpayers' payments constitute deductible
charitable contributions under § 170); Hobbet, supra note 9, at 29-30 (same).
66. Miller, 829 F.2d at 502; see infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (discussing
rationale of United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Miller for not adopting
test for determining whether payment constitutes charitable contribution).
67. Miller, 829 F.2d at 502-03.
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that all of the available tests for determining whether payments are contri-
butions under section 170 coalesce, the Fourth Circuit applied the detached
and disinterested generosity test to demonstrate by example that the pari-
shioner's payments were not charitable contributions.68 The court stated that
the mandatory payment structure of the church was indicative of the
parishioner's intent to pay money in exchange for a commensurate benefit
in the form of religious services.69 Because the court held that the mandatory
payment structure indicated that the parishioner did not intend to contribute
to the church when he made the mandatory payments, the Fourth Circuit
held that the parishioner's payments did not constitute a contribution and
were not deductible under section 170.70
Contrary to the other federal circuit courts' holdings that the parishion-
ers' fixed payments were not deductible, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit in Staples v. Commissionere' held that a parishioners'
mandatory payments to the Church of Scientology were deductible as
charitable contributions under section 170 of the Code.7 2 The Eighth Circuit
stated that a charitable contribution is a transfer of money in return for
less than adequate consideration (commensurate benefit test) . 3 In deciding
whether the payments were deductible, the Eighth Circuit noted that, in
Helvering v. Bliss,74 the United States Supreme Court had suggested that
courts broadly construe the charitable contribution deduction to encourage
taxpayers to make charitable contributions. 75 In accordance with the Supreme
Court's ruling that courts broadly should construe the charitable contribu-
tion deduction, the Eighth Circuit stated that a contribution to a charity
benefits the charity regardless of the contributor's intent.' 6 Thus, the Eighth
68. Id. at 503.
69. Id. In Miller v. Commissioner the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit stated that the structure of a transaction evidences the motives of the transferor. Id.
According to the Fourth Circuit, a church's mandatory payment structure indicates that a
parishioner making mandatory payments does not intend to make charitable contributions to
the church. Id.
70. Id. at '505. In Miller v. Commissioner the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that, because the Church of Scientology's payment scheme is mandatory,
the church's payment structure demonstrated that the parishioner did not intend to contribute
to the church. Id. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that the parishioner's mandatory payments
to the Church of Scientology did not satisfy the detached and disinterested generosity test. Id.
71. 821 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1987).
72. Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1327 (8th Cir. 1987).
73. Id. at 1326; see also United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 513
(noting that payment is not deductible charitable contribution under § 170 if amount of
payment is commensurate with value of benefit that transferor received in return for payment).
74. 293 U.S. 144 (1934).
75. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326; see also supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (discussing
Congress' goals in enacting charitable contribution deduction); cf. Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S.
144, 151 (1934) (stating that courts should construe charitable deduction in taxpayer's favor
because Congress primarily enacted § 170 to stimulate taxpayers' contributions to charities).
76. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326; see Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d
146, 147 (lst Cir.) (stating that Congress intended charitable contributions to benefit charitable
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Circuit rejected the detached and disinterested generosity test, noting that
a contributor's intent in making a contribution is irrelevant in determining
whether a payment is a contribution.7 The Eighth Circuit maintained,
therefore, that, to comport with the Supreme Court's suggestion of broadly
applying the charitable deduction and with Congress' goals in enacting the
charitable deduction, courts should permit taxpayers to take deductions for
contributions that benefit a charity, regardless of the taxpayers' intent.
78
The Eighth Circuit in Staples stated that the church directly benefited from
the parishioners' payments and that the parishioners received only religious
benefits in return for their payments. 7 9 The court recognized, furthermore,
that no court ever has denied a deduction to a taxpayer for payments that
the taxpayer made to a church in return for the right to participate in
religious servicesA0 Additionally, the Eight Circuit stated that religious
observances of any faith spiritually benefit the general public whether the
religion practices congregational or individual worship and whether the
donations are voluntary or mandatory.8' After determining that the church
and the public benefited from the mandatory payments and that the pari-
shioners received only religious benefits in return for their payments, the
Eighth Circuit held that the payments were deductible under section 170.82
The divergent reasoning between the Eighth Circuit and the other federal
circuit courts demonstrates that the federal courts of appeals have had
difficulty in determining whether mandatory payments that parishioners
make to the Church of Scientology in return for religious services are
deductible as charitable contributions under section 170 of the Code. 3 In
organizations regardless of transferor's intent in making contributions), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
976 (1967); Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (noting that
courts should not examine intent of contributor because analysis of taxpayer's intent and
motive in making contributions is unreliable).
77. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1327 (stating that detached and disinterested generosity, test
is inapplicable under § 170 because transferor's intent is irrelevant under § 170).
78. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme
Court's belief that courts broadly should construe "contribution" to support Congress' goal
of stimulating charitable contributions under § 170).
79, See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1325 (stating that parishioners' payments are source of
church's financial resources). In Staples v. Commissioner the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit stated that religious observances of any faith spiritually benefit the
general public and members of the faith. Id. at 1326. The Eighth Circuit noted that the private
benefit that a parishioner receives from religious observances is incidental to the broader good
served by the parishioner's ability to participate in religious observances. Id.
80. Id. at 1326.
81. Id. at 1326; see Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (stating that
preachers' selling religious literature rather than donating literature to parishioners did not
alter benefits that religion provided for public or change religion into commercial transaction).
82. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1327.
83. See supra notes 33-82 and accompanying text (discussing federal circuit courts'
application of different tests for determining whether mandatory payments that individuals
made to Church of Scientology are deductible charitable contributions under § 170). Because
the federal circuit courts have encountered difficulty in analyzing mandatory contributions
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Graham, the Ninth Circuit adopted the detached and disinterested generosity
test to assess whether the parishioners intended to contribute to the church.1
4
The First Circuit in Hernandez adopted both the detached and disinterested
generosity test and the American Bar market test to evaluate whether the
parishioner's payments constituted contributions."5 The First Circuit stated,
however, that the payments must qualify as donations under the detached
and disinterested generosity test before the court would apply the American
Bar market test to determine whether the payments constitute deductible
charitable contributions under section 170.6 Although the Fourth Circuit
refused to adopt a particular test in Miller because the court believed that
all of the tests would render the same result, the court applied the detached
and disinterested generosity test to demonstrate by example that the parish-
iondr never intended to contribute to the church and that the payments
were not contributions under section 170.87 The Eighth Circuit in Staples,
however, refused to delve into the parishioners' intent in contributing to
the church. 8  In determining that the parishioners' mandatory payments
were contributions under section 170, the Eighth Circuit adopted the com-
mensurate benefit test, holding that the value of the benefits that the church
received from the parishioners' payments exceeded the value of the benefits
that the parishioners received from the church in return for making the
under section 170 of the Code, the circuit courts have applied various tests to determine
whether mandatory payments constitute deductible charitable contributions. See Graham, 822
F.2d at 846 (applying detached and disinterested generosity test); Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1216
(applying detached and disinterested generosity test and American Bar test); Miller, 829 F.2d
at 501 (contending that all tests virtually are identical); Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326 (applying
commensurate benefit test).
84. Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1987); see supra notes 34-53
and accompanying text (discussing United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit's appli-
cation of detached and disinterested generosity test in Graham v. Commissioner to determine
whether mandatory payments are deductible charitable contributions).
85. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1218 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying
detached and disinterested generosity test and American Bar market test to determine whether
parishioner's payments to church constituted charitable contributions); see also supra notes
54-62 and accompanying text (discussing First Circuit's decision in Hernandez).
86. See Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1218 (applying detached and disinterested generosity test
before applying American Bar test); see also supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text
(discussing First Circuit's explanation in Hernandez that parishioner's payments must meet
requirements of detached and disinterested generosity test before court would apply American
Bar test to determine whether parishioner's payments to church constituted charitable contri-
butions).
87. Miller v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1987); see supra notes 64-70
and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's application of detached and disinterested
generosity test in Miller to demonstrate by example that parishioners' mandatory payments
were not deductible charitable contributions).
88. Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1326 (8th Cir. 1987) (refusing to focus on
parishioner's intent in determining whether parishioner's payments constituted charitable con-
tributions); see supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth Circuit's application
of commensurate benefit test in Staples to determine whether parishioner's mandatory payments
to church were deductible charitable contributions under § 170).
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payments.8 9 Although a majority of the federal circuit courts has employed
the detached and disinterested generosity test to determine whether man-
datory payments to the Church of Scientology are contributions, a careful
analysis of the detached and disinterested generosity test reveals that the
Eighth Circuit was correct in refusing to adopt the test to assess whether
mandatory payments constitute deductible charitable contributions under
section 170 of the Code.90
Although some circuit courts have applied the detached and disinterested
generosity test to assess whether payments qualify as charitable contributions
under section 170, the United States Supreme Court originally developed
the test in Commissioner v. Duberstein9 for determining whether a voluntary
donation constitutes a gift under section 102 of the Code. 92 By categorizing
89. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326; see also supra note 88 (discussing Eighth Circuit's use of
commensurate benefit test in Staples to determine whether parishioners' mandatory payments
to Church of Scientology constituted deductible charitable contributions).
90. See infra notes 92-160 and accompanying text (suggesting that courts should adopt
commensurate benefit test to assess whether mandatory payments constitute deductible chari-
table contributions under § 170).
91. 363 U.S. 278, 284 (1960).
92. See Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying detached
and disinterested generosity test, which provides that contributions are charitable if contributors
made payments for detached and disinterested motives); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d
1212, 1216 (Ist Cir. 1987) (applying detached and disinterested generosity test and American
Bar market test); Miller v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500, 501 (4th Cir. 1987) (applying detached
and disinterested generosity test to demonstrate by example that mandatory payments are not
deductible charitable contributions under any test).
In Graham v. Commissioner, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
adopted the detached and disinterested generosity test to determine whether the parishioner's
mandatory payments to the Church of Scientology constituted deductible charitable contribu-
tions under § 170. See Graham, 822 F.2d at 846; see also supra notes 34-53 and accompanying
text (discussing Ninth Circuit's application of detached and disinterested generosity test in
Graham v. Commissioner to determine whether mandatory payments are deductible charitable
contributions). In Hernandez v. Commissioner, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit also applied the detached and disinterested generosity test to assess whether the
parishioner's mandatory payments to the Church of Scientology were charitable contributions.
See Hernandez, 819 F.2d at 1216; see also supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text (discussing
First Circuit'sapplication of detached and disinterested test and American Bar test in Hernandez
v. Commissioner for assessing whether parishioner's mandatory payments were deductible
charitable contributions). Although the court did not adopt any test, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied the detached and disinterested generosity test in
Miller v. Commissioner to show that mandatory payments which the parishioners made to the
Church of Scientology were not deductible charitable contributions under § 170. See Miller,
829 F.2d at 501; see also supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's
application of detached and disinterested generosity test in Miller v. Commissioner to dem-
onstrate by example that mandatory payments were not deductible charitable contributions
under any test).
Although some federal circuit courts have examined payments under § 170 by applying
the detached and disinterested generosity test, the United States Supreme Court originally
developed the detached and disinterested generosity test in Commissioner v. Duberstein.
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 284 (1960). The Supreme Court developed the
detached and disinterested test to determine whether a donor's payment to a donee constituted
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property as a gift rather than compensation for services, the taxpayer in
Duberstein attempted to exclude from the taxpayer's gross income under
section 102 the value of the property that an individual gave the taxpayer
as compensation for services.9 Under section 61 of the Code, gross income
includes compensation for services. 94 Under section 102, however, taxpayers
may exclude from gross income amounts received as gifts.95 Courts have
observed that, because taxpayers may exclude gifts from gross income,
taxpayers have an incentive to categorize compensation for services as gifts.
9 6
Therefore, courts narrowly have construed the term "gift" under section
102.9 To ensure that courts narrowly construe "gift" under section 102,
a gift under § 102 of the Code and not as a test to determine whether a payment to a charity
is a deductible charitable contribution under § 170 of the Code. Id.
93. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 283-84. Although the donor gave the donee in Duberstein
an automobile as compensation for the donee's services, the donee attempted to characterize
the automobile as a gift. Id.
94. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (1987) (defining gross income). Gross income includes all income
earned as compensation for services. Id. "Compensation for services" includes fees, commis-
sions, and fringe benefits. Id. "Taxable income" is gross income reduced by any deductions.
See I.R.C. § 63(a) (1987).
95. See I.R.C. § 102(a) (1987) (stating that gross income does not include value of
property acquired by gift). Section 102 of the Code permits taxpayers to exclude the value of
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance. Id. Taxpayers may not exclude,
however, the income from property that taxpayers received as a gift, bequest, devise, or
inheritance. Id.
96. See Revenue v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956) (noting that taxpayers have incentive
to characterize all receipts as gifts); Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952)
(stating that, because taxpayers have incentive to characterize compensation as gifts, courts
should permit taxpayers to exclude as "gifts" under § 102 only property that donor gave to
taxpayer with detached and disinterested generosity); Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 380 F.2d 146, 149 (1st Cir.) (stating that courts carefully should guard against possibility
that taxpayers might disguise compensation for services as gifts), cert. denied 389 U.S. 976
(1967); Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1090 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (discussing need
to determine whether taxpayer characterized compensation for services as gift).
97. See Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949) (suggesting that courts very
narrowly construe "gift" under § 102 of Code); Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner,
380 F.2d 146, 149 (1st Cir.) (stating that compelling reasons exist for carefully assessing
possibility for taxpayers' disguise of compensation for services as "gifts"), cert. denied 389
U.S. 976 (1967); Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1090 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (discussing
need to determine whether taxpayer characterized compensation for services as gift); see also
supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing incentive for taxpayers to classify compen-
sation for services as gifts). In Commissioner v. Jacobson the United States Supreme Court
noted that, because taxpayers may exclude gifts from taxable income, courts narrowly should
construe "gift" under § 102 to diminish a taxpayer's incentive to characterize compensation
for services as deductible gifts. Jacobson, 336 U.S. at 49. Although courts, Congress, and the
Service permit taxpayers to take deductions for gifts under § 102, Congress did not enact the
gift exclusion to encourage donors to make gifts to donees. See Colliton, supra note 9, at 999
(discussing rationale for narrow construction of "gift" under § 102). Because the government
does not benefit from the gift exclusion under § 102, but does benefit from the charitable
contribution deduction under § 170, courts broadly should construe contribution under § 170
to encourage taxpayers to make charitable contributions. Id.; see supra notes 2-5 and accom-
panying text (discussing Congress' goals in enacting charitable contribution deduction under §
170).
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the Supreme Court in Duberstein developed the detached and disinterested
generosity test under which a payment constitutes a gift under section 102
if the donor intended to give the donee a gift rather than compensation. 98
In Duberstein, the Supreme Court noted that the relationship between the
donor and the donee is indicative of whether the donor intended a payment
as a gift.99 The detached and disinterested generosity test may appear circular
because a court determines under the test that a transfer of property is a
gift if the donor intended the donation as a gift.'00 The Supreme Court
believed, however, that by applying the detached and disinterested generosity
test under section 102, courts rarely would permit a taxpayer to exclude
from taxable income payments characterized as gifts under section 102
because of the taxpayer's difficulty in proving that the donor had the intent
to make a gift. 01 Thus, the Supreme Court's rationale for developing the
detached and disinterested generosity test reveals the Court's desire to restrict
the meaning of the term "gift" under section 102.102
Although courts restrictively should apply the term "gift" under section
102, neither Congress nor the United States Supreme Court has advocated
a similarly narrow construction of the term "contribution" under section
170.103 Congress enacted the section 170 charitable contribution deduction
98. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960). In Commissioner v.
Jacobson the United States Supreme Court suggested that courts narrowly construe "gift"
under § 102 of the Code because taxpayers often characterize compensation for services as
deductible gifts. Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949). The Supreme Court has
stressed the importance of scrutinizing the motives of the transferor to prevent the donee from
disguising compensation for services rendered as gifts. Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S.
711, 716 (1952). The Supreme Court developed the detached and disinterested generosity test
to examine the intent of a donor in transferring property to a donee. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at
290.
99. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 287-89. In Commissioner v. Duberstein the United States
Supreme Court stated that the relationship between the donor and donee indicates whether
the donor intended the transfer of property as a gift under § 102. Id. The Supreme Court
suggested, for example, that employers are less likely to transfer gifts to employees than a
father is to his son. Id.
100. See Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 289 (1960) (suggesting circularity of detached and
disinterested generosity test). Under the detached and disinterested generosity test, a taxpayer's
payment is a charitable contribution if the taxpayer proves that he intended to contribute to
a charity by making a payment to the charity. Id.
101. See Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 289 (1960) (suggesting that requirements of detached
and disinterested generosity test are difficult to satisfy because taxpayer must prove intent to
make contribution to charity).
102. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court's
rationale for developing detached and disinterested generosity test to assess whether transfers
of property constitute gifts under § 102 of Code).
103. See Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 151 (1934) (noting that courts should construe
charitable deduction provision in taxpayer's favor because Congress enacted § 170 primarily
to stimulate taxpayers to contribute to charities). In determining whether voluntary or man-
datory payments constitute deductible charitable contributions under § 170, some courts broadly
have construed "contribution" in accordance with Congress' goal in enacting § 170 to increase
charitable contributions. See id.; Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1326 (8th Cir. 1987)
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in an attempt to liberalize the tax law in the taxpayer's favor and promote
public policy by giving incentives for private contributions to charitable
organizations. 14 In enacting the charitable contribution deduction, Congress
emphasized the need for individuals to contribute to charities, not the need
for individuals to intend to benefit a charity. 05 The purpose of the deduction
was to encourage charitable contributions regardless of individuals' reasons
for contributing. 10 Accordingly, courts should not focus on the intention
of a contributor in determining whether the contributor's payments to a
charity constitute contributions under section 170.101 Because the detached
and disinterested generosity test focuses on the contributor's intent, courts
that apply the detached and disinterested generosity test circumvent Con-
gress' purpose in enacting the charitable contribution deduction. 08 Moreo-
ver, the Supreme Court developed the detached and disinterested generosity
(stating that courts broadly should construe "contribution" under § 170); Crosby Valve &
Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146, 147 (1st Cir.) (suggesting that Congress intended
courts to find charity in purposes and works of qualifying organizations and not in intent of
contributor by narrowly construing "contribution" under § 170), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976
(1967); Haak v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (stating that courts
should not examine intent of contributor because analysis of taxpayer's contributive intent is
unreliable). Because Congress' primary goal in enacting the charitable contribution deduction
was to stimulate taxpayer's charitable contributions, Congress intended courts broadly to
construe "contribution" in the taxpayer's favor. See H.R. REp. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 19 (1938) (stating that Congress' enacted charitable contribution deduction to increase
private charitable contributions); see also See B. BrrrcaR, supra note 2, at § 19-1 (discussing
Congress' purpose of stimulating charitable contributions by enacting charitable contribution
deduction); Colliton, supra note 9, at 999 (stating that courts broadly should construe
"contribution" because Congress enacted charitable contribution deduction to liberalize tax
law in taxpayer's favor).
104. See Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 151 (1935) (suggesting that Congress intended
courts broadly to construe charitable contribution deduction under § 170 of Code).
105. See id.; Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1326 (1987) (noting that, to
determine whether payment is charitable contribution, courts should examine benefits that
charitable organization received from contribution rather than contributor's motives in con-
tributing); Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146, 147 (1st Cir.) (stating
that Congress intended courts to find charity in purpose and work of qualifying organization
and not in taxpayer's intent to contribute), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967). By focusing on
the benefit that a charity received from a contribution rather than the taxpayer's intent to
contribute, courts broadly will construe charitable contribution under § 170. Id.
106. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' purposes in enacting
charitable contribution deduction); supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing Congress'
intent that courts broadly construe "contribution" under § 170).
107. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent that courts
broadly construe "contribution" under § 170); supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Congress' goals in enacting charitable contribution deduction under § 170).
108. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining that United States Supreme
Court's rationale in developing detached and disinterested generosity test was to limit taxpayers'
ability to take deductions for gifts under § 102); supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text
(discussing Congress' intent to stimulate charitable contributions by permitting taxpayers to
take deductions for charitable contributions); supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text
(discussing Congress' intent that courts narrowly construe "gift" under § 102 and broadly
construe "contribution" under § 170).
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test for determining whether a payment is a gift under section 102 and
never suggested that courts apply the test to assess whether a payment
constitutes a charitable contribution under section 170.10 Therefore, courts
should not construe narrowly the term "contribution" by applying the
detached and disinterested generosity test to determine whether a payment
constitutes a deductible charitable contribution." 0
Just as courts should not apply the detached and disinterested generosity
test to analyze payments under section 170 of the Code, courts should not
apply the American Bar market test to determine whether payments that a
parishioner made to a church in return for purely religious and spiritual
benefits constitute contributions under section 170."' In applying the market
test, courts have separated into dual payments the voluntary payments that
a taxpayer made to a charitable organization." 2 A dual payment is a payment
one part of which benefits a charity and the other part of which purchases
for the taxpayer a marketable benefit." 3 In the voluntary contribution cases
in which courts have applied the market test, courts have permitted a
contributor to deduct as a charitable contribution the portion of the payment
that exceeds the fair market value of the benefit which the contributor
received in return for his payment to the organization." 4 The courts have
109. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme
Court's intent in developing detached and disinterested generosity test).
110. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme
Court's adoption of detached and disinterested generosity test to determine if payment
constitutes gift under § 102 of Code).
111. See infra notes 112-17 (suggesting that courts should not apply American Bar market
test to determine whether payments constitute deductible charitable contributions under § 170).
112. See, e.g., United States v. American Bar Endowment, 447 U.S. 105, 120 (1986)
(holding that taxpayer's payment to endowment fund consisted of both charitable contribution
and transfer in return for marketable benefit to taxpayer in form of insurance policy); Oppewal
v. United States, 468 F.2d 1000, 1006 (1st Cir. 1972) (stating that portion of parents' payment
to school for children's education that exceeded value children's education was charitable
contribution); Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778, 785 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that parents'
payment to parochial school for children's education was charitable contribution to extent that
payment exceeded church's cost in providing education to children). Courts that have considered
whether voluntary payments are deductible charitable contributions under § 170 have examined
the fair market value of the benefit that the charity gave the taxpayer in return for the
payment. See, e.g, Oppewal, 468 F.2d at 1002 (discussing whether voluntary payments that
parents made to school for children's education constituted deductible charitable contributions
under § 170); Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 415 (CL. Ct. 1971) (considering
whether sewing machines that corporation voluntarily sold at discounts to charitable organi-
zations constituted deductible charitable contributions); DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d
373, 376 (9th Cir. 1962) (assessing whether voluntary payments that parents made to school
for children's education constituted deductible charitable contributions); cf. Staples v. Com-
missioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1328 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that United States Supreme Court in
American Bar applied rule that taxpayer may deduct portion of payment to which exceeds
fair market value of tangible benefit).
113. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (explaining that dual voluntary payment
consist of portion that is charitable contribution and portion that taxpayer gave to charity in
return for benefit with fair market value).
114. See American Bar, 477 U.S. at 120 (stating that charitable contribution is equal to
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ascertained the fair market value of a contributor's benefit by comparing
the fair market value of a similar benefit offered in the market place with
the amount of money that the contributor paid to the organization."' Under
the market test, if the amount of money that the contributor paid to the
organization exceeded the fair market value of the similar benefit, courts
have permitted the contributor to take a deduction for the amount of the
contributor's payment that exceeded the fair market value of the similar
benefit. 1 6 A court cannot apply properly the market test, however, if the
taxpayer does not receive a marketable benefit."
7
In the Scientology cases, the parishioners did not receive marketable
benefits in return for their payments to the church." 8 Rather, the parishion-
ers received purely religious benefits." 9 Although the parishioners did not
receive marketable benefits in return for the payments to the church, some
of the federal circuit courts have attempted to place upon the parishioners
amount exceeding fair market value of benefit charity gave to taxpayer in return for payment);
see also supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing courts' application of market test
when taxpayer received marketable benefit from charity in return for payment to charity). In
United States v. American Bar Endowment, the United States Supreme Court calculated the
value of the insurance policy that the taxpayer received from the endowment fund in return
for his payment to the endowment fund by comparing the amount of the taxpayer's payment
with the cost of a comparable insurance policy on the market. American Bar, 477 U.S. at
120. The Supreme Court held that the portion of the taxpayer's payment that exceeded the
fair market value of the insurance policy was a deductible charitable contribution. Id.
115. See supra note 112-14 and accompanying text (discussing courts that have held that
charitable contributions are payments that exceed fair market value of benefit which charity
gave taxpayer in return for taxpayer's payment to charity).
116. See United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 120 (1986) (stating
that charitable contribution to charity is amount that exceeds fair market value of benefit that
charity gave to taxpayer in return for payment); see also supra notes 41-45 and accompanying
text (discussing United States Supreme Court's application of market test in United States v.
American Bar Endowment).
117. See American Bar, 477 U.S. at 120 (stating that charitable contribution is equal to
amount exceeding fair market value of benefit that charity gave to taxpayer in return for
payment). In applying the market test, a court examines the market value of the benefit that
a charity gave to a taxpayer in return for the taxpayer's payment to the charity. See id. If
the charity did not give the taxpayer a benefit with a fair market value in return for the
taxpayer's payment, courts properly cannot apply the market test. See id.
118. See Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1327 (8th Cir. 1987). In Staples v.
Commissioner the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined that the
parishioners of the Church of Scientology received privileges of church membership in return
for the parishioner's mandatory payments to the church. See id.; supra notes 19-32 and
accompanying text (discussing facts of Scientology cases). Church membership is not a
significant economic benefit that has a monetary, marketable value. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1327.;
see Murphy v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 249, 253 (1970) (noting that religious benefits do not
have monetary values). The sale of a religious benefit does convert the religious benefit into
a benefit with a fair market value, nor does the sale render the transfer of the religious benefit
in return for a payment a commercial transaction. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 111 (1943) (sale of religious literature is not commercial transaction).
119. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting that church gave parishioners no
economic or monetary benefits but did give parishioners rights of belonging to church and
participating in religious services).
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the burden of proving the value of the religious service. 20 After the
parishioners have proved the value of the religious service, courts have
required that the parishioners demonstrate the amount of money that the
parishioners intended to constitute a charitable contribution, which is the
portion of the payment exceeding the fair market value of the religious
service.' 2' The circuit courts' desire to place a monetary value on religious
services, however, violates the Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment
to the United States Constitution.2 2 The United States Supreme Court has
held that, under the Free Exercise Clause, the government may not evaluate
the worth of religious services. 23 Moreover, the task of valuing religious
services is impossible, because a market place for religious services does not
exist.'2 Because courts that attempt to assess the value of religious services
violate the Constitution and because of the difficulty of determining the
fair market values of religious services, courts should not apply the market
test to payments that a parishioner makes to a church in return for religious
services.1
25
Additionally, to support Congress' goal of making tax law understand-
able and clear for taxpayers, courts should refuse to apply the detached
and disinterested generosity test and the market test. 26 The detached and
120. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1218 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that
parishioner failed to prove that payment exceeded fair market value of religious benefits that
church gave parishioner in return for parishioner's payments); Miller v. Commissioner 829
F.2d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that parishioner did not prove that mandatory payments
exceeded cost of religious services which church provided in return for parishioner's payments).
121. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (noting that parishioner has burden to
prove that parishioner's payment to charity exceeded fair market value of benefit that charity
gave to parishioner in return for payment).
122. See Walz v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (holding that government may
not assess value of church programs under Free Exercise Clause of United States Constitution);
see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. I (stating that Congress shall make no law which establishes
religion or prohibits citizens' free exercise of religion).
123. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 674 (1970) (stating that government may not assess value of
church programs under Free Exercise Clause of United States Constitution).
124. See Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1327 (8th Cir. 1987) (refusing to apply
American Bar market test because of inherently charitable nature of payment for religious
participation and incongruity in attempting to place fair market value on religious participation
that does not have fair market value).
125. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text (discussing American Bar market test
as inapt to assess whether parishioners' payments to church in return for religious participation
constitute contributions under § 170).
126. See Treasury Report on Tax Simplification and Reform (Report to the President,
Nov. 27 1984) (stating that Congress should simplify income tax code and regulations for
taxpayers); J. FRANrD, S. LurD & R. STEP'ENs, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION
22-28 (1985) (discussing taxpayers' need for clear income tax regulations and government's
need for taxpayers to understand income tax regulations); Colliton, supra note 9, at 1002
(stating that taxpayers have right to clear standards for determining deductions, while Service
and courts need clear standards for deciding controversies); infra notes 127-34 and accompa-
nying text (suggesting that courts should not apply detached and disinterested test or American
Bar market test to determine whether mandatory payments constitute contributions under §
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disinterested generosity test gives no clear guidance to taxpayers in planning
charitable payments because the test requires an arduous analysis of the
taxpayers' motives in making the contribution. 2 7 The market test also does
not provide a clear standard because the test places an unreasonable burden
of proof on a taxpayer who receives religious benefits in return for con-
tributing to a church.'2 By applying the detached and disinterested generosity
test and the market test to determine whether contributions are charitable,
a court would impose on a parishioner the burden of demonstrating the
value of the benefit that the parishioner received in return for the parishion-
er's payment to the church, and the portion of the parishioner's payment
that the parishioner intended to constitute a charitable contribution. 29 If a
court imposes on a parishioner the heavy burden of proving the parishioner's
intent in contributing to a church for the parishioner to take a deduction
for a charitable contribution, the court will discourage parishioners from
contributing to churches. 30 Thus, applying the detached and disinterested
generosity test or the market test to determine whether a payment constitutes
a charitable contribution frustrates Congress' purpose in enacting the char-
itable contribution deduction to encourage individuals to make charitable
contributions. '31
170 of Code). Without clear standards for determining deductions, taxpayers will have little
motivation to pay income tax. See J. FmELAND, S. Lm & R. STEPBENs, supra, at 22, 28.
The United States tax system's collection of income tax depends on the willingness of taxpayers
voluntarily to pay income taxes. See id. at 28. Because the tax system relies on taxpayers'
motivation to pay taxes, Congress should make taxes fair and should provide clear income
tax guidelines for taxpayers. See id.
127. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 283-84 (1960) (developing detached
and disinterested generosity test to assess whether taxpayer may exclude property received as
gift under § 102); supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme
Court's development and application of detached and disinterested generosity test to determine
whether donor's payment constituted gift under § 102).
128. See supra notes 111-25 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty in applying
market test to determine whether mandatory payments to charitable organization constitute
deductible charitable contributions). The market test requires a parishioner to demonstrate the
portion of the payment that exceeds the cost of the benefit which the parishioner received
from a church before the parishioner may take a deduction for the portion of the payment.
See id.
129. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (stating that detached and disinterested
generosity test and market test are difficult to apply and do not provide taxpayers and courts
with clear standard for determining whether mandatory payments are charitable deductions
under § 170).
130. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (suggesting that difficulty in applying
detached and disinterested generosity test and market test would lead to taxpayers' discontent
with tax system and decreases in charitable contributions).
131. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' goals in enacting
charitable contribution deduction); supra notes 103-30 and accompanying text (suggesting that
detached and disinterested generosity test and market test are difficult to apply and provide
unclear standards for taxpayers in claiming deductions and for courts deciding disputes).
Because unclear standards and inconsistent court decisions will decrease taxpayers' motivation
voluntarily to pay income taxes and likelihood of making charitable contributions, the detached
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Instead of mistakenly focusing on a contributor's intent under the
detached and disinterested generosity test or on the fair market value of
the religious services under the market test, courts should apply the test
that the Eighth Circuit adopted in Staples.3 2 Under the Eighth Circuit's
commensurate benefit test, a taxpayer may take deductions for charitable
contributions as long as the benefit that the charity receives from the
contribution is greater in value than the benefit that the parishioner receives
from the charity in return for the contribution. 3 3 The commensurate benefit
test does not force a court to analyze a taxpayer's motives in making a
contribution and thus is a much clearer standard than the detached and
disinterested generosity test for determining whether payments are charitable
contributions .134 Additionally, because a taxpayer's intent is irrelevant under
the commensurate benefit test, the taxpayer will not have the impossible
burden of proving his intent to make a charitable contribution. 35 Thus, by
and disinterested generosity test and market test will circumvent Congress' goals in enacting
the charitable contribution deduction to stimulate charitable contributions. See supra notes
126-30 and accompanying text (stating that detached and disinterested generosity test and
market test are difficult to apply and provide unclear standards for taxpayers in claiming
deductions); see also supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' goals in
enacting charitable contribution deduction).
132. See Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1326 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that
charitable contribution is transfer of money or property to charity without receiving benefit
from charity equal in value to payment (commensurate benefit test)); supra notes 71-82 and
accompanying text (discussing application of commensurate benefit test by Eighth Circuit in
Staples to determine whether mandatory payment constituted deductible charitable contribu-
tions); infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for court's application
of commensurate benefit test to assess whether mandatory payments were deductible charitable
contributions).
133. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326 (describing commensurate benefit test).
134. See id. (noting difficulty in attempting to ascertain fair market value of religious
services or parishioner's intent in making payment to church); supra notes 103-30 (discussing
difficulty and ambiguity in applying detached and disinterested generosity test and market test
to determine whether payments are deductible charitable contributions). The commensurate
benefit test requires courts to compare the benefits that a charity receives from a taxpayer's
payment with the benefit that the charity gives to the taxpayer in return for the taxpayer's
contribution. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326. Although the commensurate benefit test entails
examining benefits, the test does not require courts to delve into the mind of the contributor
which the detached and disinterested generosity test requires of courts. Id. Under the com-
mensurate benefit test, courts do not have to assess the fair market value of religious benefits
nor do taxpayers have to prove that the value of their payments that exceeds the fair market
value of religious participation in the church. Id.
135. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326 (describing commensurate benefit test); see also supra
notes 98-101 and accompanying text (stating that donee must prove that donor intended to
make gift to donee). When applying the detached and disinterested generosity test under §
170, courts have required taxpayers to prove that they intended to contribute to a charity. See
Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that, under detached and
disinterested generosity test, contributions are charitable if contributors intended to contribute
to charity); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1216 (1st Cir. 1987) (requiring
taxpayers to demonstrate taxpayers' motives in making payments to charity); Miller v. Com-
missioner, 829 F.2d 500, 501 (4th Cir. 1987) (requiring parishioner to prove that he intended
to contribute to church).
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adopting the commensurate benefit test rather than the detached and dis-
interested generosity test or the market test, courts broadly may construe
the term "contribution" under section 170 and permit more taxpayers to
take deductions for charitable contributions. 3 6 Because the commensurate
benefit test enables courts broadly to apply the charitable contribution
deduction, courts applying the test promote Congress' goals in enacting the
charitable contribution deduction, which include promoting private support
of charitable organizations and freeing the government from subsidizing
charitable organizations. 137 In addition, the commensurate benefit test fur-
nishes courts and taxpayers with a clear standard for determining whether
a payment constitutes a contribution under section 170.138
Under the commensurate benefit test, the parishioners in the Scientology
cases did not receive a commensurate benefit in return for their contributions
to the Church of Scientology. 139 Accordingly, the parishioners were entitled
to take a deduction for their payments to the church. 4° Under the com-
mensurate benefit test, if the amount of the payments that the parishioners
made to the church exceeded the value of the religious benefits that the
parishioners received from the church, the entire amount of the parishioners'
payments constituted charitable contributions.1 4' In all of the Scientology
cases, although the contributions of church members were the only means
of financial support for the church, the church had developed a large,
136. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (stating that commensurate benefit test
does not require taxpayer to prove taxpayer's motive in making contribution). Under the
commensurate benefit test, courts do not inquire into the motive of a contributor. Id. Because
a taxpayer's motive in contributing are irrelevant under the commensurate benefit test, courts
more frequently will permit a taxpayer to take a deduction for a charitable contribution than
under the detached and disinterested generosity test. Id. The more that courts permit a taxpayer
to take a deduction for charitable contributions, the more likely a taxpayer will make charitable
contributions. Id.; see supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' goals in
allowing taxpayers to take deductions for charitable contributions).
137. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text (arguing that courts broadly should
interpret "contribution" under § 170); supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text (discussing
Congress' goals in enacting charitable contribution deduction).
138. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text (suggesting that courts should apply
commensurate benefit test in determining whether payments to charities constitute deductible
charitable contributions under § 170).
139. Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1327 (8th Cir. 1987); see infra notes 140-
45 and accompanying text (stating that parishioners did not receive commensurate benefit for
payments that parishioners made to church).
140. Staples, 821 F.2d at 1327 (8th Cir. 1987).
141. See Staples, 821 F.2d at 1326 (describing commensurate benefit test). Under the
commensurate benefit test, a court determines whether a contributor's payment to a charity is
equal in value to the cost of the benefit that the charity gave to the contributor in return for
the payment to the charity. See id. If the contributor's payment is commensurate in value
with the benefit that the charity gave to the contributor, then the contributor's payment is
not a deductible charitable contribution. See id. The commensurate benefit test supports
Congress' goals in enacting the charitable contribution deduction to ensure that charities benefit
more from contributions than does the contributor. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying
text (discussing Congress' goals in enacting charitable contribution deduction).
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financial surplus of funds.142 The church's large financial pool suggests that
the value of the benefit that the church received from the parishioners'
payments exceeded the expense that the church incurred in providing relig-
ious services to the parishioners. Conversely, the church's large financial
surplus suggests that the value of the parishioners' payments to the church
exceeded the value of the benefit that the parishioners received in return
for their payments to the church. Therefore, under the commensurate benefit
test, the parishioners' payments constituted charitable contributions under
section 170 of the Code.1
43
In addition to permitting deductions under the commensurate benefit
test for the parishioners' payments to the church, courts should hold, in
accordance with other Service rulings, that the parishioners' mandatory
payments to the church constitute charitable contributions. 44 Some of the
circuit courts in the Scientology cases have maintained that the mandatory
structure of the payments is evidence of a parishioner's intent not to make
a contribution and of a commercial transaction between the church and the
parishioner. 45 In deciding whether mandatory payments that parishioners
make to a church in return for the right to participate in religious activities
are deductions, however, courts should consider other types of mandatory
payments that the Service views as deductible. 46 For example, members of
the Mormon Church may deduct payments made for tithing, which is a
prerequisite to receiving admission to the church. 47 Also, members of the
Jewish faith may deduct fixed dues that the members pay for seats in a
synagogue during High Holy days. 4 Finally, the Service has ruled that the
142. See Brief for Appellant at 4, Miller v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1987)
(No. 86-2090) (stating that Church of Scientology had developed large financial account
resulting from parishioner's mandatory payments).
143. See supra note 139-44 and accompanying text (suggesting that, because church's
benefits exceeded parishioners' benefits from making payments to church, parishioners' pay-
ments constitute charitable contributions under commensurate benefit test).
144. See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text (discussing parishioners' mandatory
payments to churches other than to Church of Scientology that Service has considered deductible
under § 170).
145. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212, 1216 (1st Cir. 1987) (focusing on
church's establishment of fixed donations in determining whether parishioner's payments to
Church of Scientology constituted deductible charitable contributions); Graham v. Commis-
sioner, 822 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that Church of Scientology's mandatory
payment structure and not type or amount of benefit that church or parishioners received
controls whether parishioners' payments constitute deductible charitable contributions); Miller
v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500, 501 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that structure of transaction
between Church of Scientology and parishioner evidences motives of parishioner in making
payment to church).
146. See infra notes 147-59 and accompanying text (discussing examples of mandatory
payment that are deductible charitable contributions under § 170).
147. See Brief for Appellant at 17, 23, Miller v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500 (4th Cir.
1987) (No. 86-2090) (noting that tithing by members of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints are deductible charitable contributions).
148. See Lobsenz v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 81, 82 (1929) (allowing synagogue member
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payments for pew rentals are deductible as charitable contributions.1 49 Courts
cannot logically distinguish the mandatory payments that the parishioners
made to the Church of Scientology from the pew rentals or the fixed dues
for the right of admission to a temple that members of other religions
pay. 10 Accordingly, courts should permit parishioners to take deductions
under section 170 for the mandatory payments that the parishioners make
to the Church of Scientology.1
5 1
Courts have had difficulty in determining whether mandatory charitable
payments are deductible under section 170.152 The difficulty has resulted
from the paucity of congressional guidance for courts to follow in deter-
mining whether a payment constitutes a contribution under section 170 .3
The parishioners in two, and the Service in one, of the Scientology cases
have petitioned the United States Supreme Court to grant rehearings.5
4
Thus, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to adopt a test for determining
whether a mandatory contribution constitutes a deductible charitable con-
tribution and to end the confusion and difficulty that the federal circuit
courts have experienced in deciding this question. 5 Until the Supreme Court
adopts a test for evaluating whether a mandatory payment constitutes a
deductible contribution, courts should adopt the commensurate benefit test
to deduct pew rentals for holy days); Brief for Appellant at 19, Miller v. Commissioner, 829
F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-2090) (stating that Service and Courts uniformly have accepted
as deductible charitable contributions payments that synagogue members made to purchase
tickets for seats in synagogue during Jewish High Holy Days).
149. See Rev. Rul. 70-47, 1970-1 C.B. 49 (stating that pew rents, church dues, and building
assessments are deductible charitable contributions).
150. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory fees that are
deductible under charitable contribution deduction). Deductible mandatory payments that
members of other churches pay are similar in structure to the mandatory payments that
members of the Church of Scientology pay. See id. Therefore, courts and the Service should
rule that mandatory payments which members make to the Church of Scientology are deductible
charitable contributions in accordance with the Service's ruling that similar mandatory payments
are deductible under § 170. See id.
151. See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text (stating that courts should permit
parishioners' to take deductions for mandatory payments to Church of Scientology because
similar mandatory payments that parishioners of other religions make to churches are deduct-
ible).
152. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing federal circuit courts' difficulty
in applying tests to determine whether parishioners' mandatory payments constituted deductible
charitable contributions under § 170).
153. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (discussing lack of congressional
guidance for assessing whether payments constitute contributions under § 170).
154. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1212 (1st Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed,
56 U.S.L.W. 3523 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1987)(No. 87-963); Commissioner v. Staples, 821 F.2d 1324
(8th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1988)(No. 87-1382);
Miller v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W.
3627 (U.S. March 1, 1988)(No. 87-1449).
155. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (noting that parishioners in two and
Service in one of Scientology cases have asked United States Supreme Court for rehearings).
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to determine whether a mandatory payment to a charity is deductible. 156
Additionally, for consistency with the Service's rulings permitting members
of other charitable organizations to deduct mandatory fees, courts should
permit a contributor to deduct mandatory payments that the contributor
makes to religious organizations. 5 7 Finally, by applying the commensurate
benefit test to determine the deductibility of mandatory payments to religious
organizations, courts will aid in making the tax rules consistent and clear
for taxpayers, encourage individuals to contribute funds to charitable or-
ganizations, and avoid the impossible task of placing a monetary value on
religious services.5 8
VINCENT J. X. HEDRICK, II
156. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text (arguing that courts should apply
commensurate benefit test to assess whether payments constitute charitable contributions under
§ 170).
157. See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text (suggesting that courts should permit
parishioners to take deductions for mandatory payments in accordance with other mandatory
payments that are deductible under § 170).
158. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text (suggesting that commensurate benefit
test provides courts with clear standard for determining whether payments are charitable
contributions under § 170); supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty in
applying detached and disinterested generosity test to determine whether payments are deductible
charitable contributions under § 170); supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text (discussing
difficulty in applying market test to assess whether mandatory payments that parishioners gave
to church in return for religious participation constitute charitable contributions under § 170).
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